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Despite the vast amount of scholarship that is produced every year 
on various aspects of Frege’s thought, until very recently there had been 
no book-length study of his life written in English. Kreiser’s monumen-
tal Gottlob Frege: Leben — Werk — Zeit (2001) and other partial accounts 
of Frege’s life written in German, such as the book by Gabriel, Kienzler 
(1997), have not been translated, whilst briefer accounts of Frege’s life in 
English appear at least partially outdated after new research has come to 
light.1 The posthumously published biography by the late Dale Jacquette, 
Frege: A Philosophical Biography, attempted to fill that significant gap in 
English scholarship.  
The result of Jacquette’s work is a 667-page book that “aims at tell-
ing a plausible story about [Frege’s] life and the unfolding of his philo-
sophical thought” [p. 6]. This general goal is broken down into an 
attempt to answer specific questions: “(1) What exactly did Frege hope 
to achieve in his mathematical and philosophical writings? (2) Should 
Frege’s efforts be considered to have succeeded or failed, and in either 
case for what reason and in what sense? (3) What meaning should Frege’s 
success or failure be understood to have for his significance in a wide-
screen panorama of the history of logic and newly emergent analytic phi-
losophy?” [p. 5]. These are relevant questions, the answers to which 
would definitely contribute to constructing an informative picture of 
Frege’s significance in the history of logic and philosophy. However, in 
my view Jacquette did not succeed in answering any of these questions.  
Like most biographies, the narrative of Frege: A Philosophical Biography 
is structured chronologically. Leaving aside a short prelude and an intro-
duction, the book is divided into fourteen chapters. Eight (Chapters 1–3, 
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5, 7, 12–14) are mainly biographical. Chapter 10 is devoted to Frege’s pro-
fessional activities between 1894 and 1902 (the years that separate the pub-
lication of the two volumes of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893,1903)): it 
mixes biographical details, a brief comment on Frege’s review of Husserl’s 
Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891) and an overview of Frege’s scientific cor-
respondence during the period. The rest of the book endeavours to ex-
pose the main elements of Frege’s major works. Chapter 4 is devoted to 
Begriffsschrift (1879); Chapter 6 to Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); Chapter 8 
to Frege’s semantical papers (1891,1892a,1892b); Chapter 9 to Grundgesetze 
and Chapter 11 to the Afterword to the second volume of Grundgesetze and 
Russell’s paradox. 
Despite some historical remarks, those parts of Jacquette’s book 
that deal with Frege’s thought are so focussed upon Frege himself that it 
is difficult to glean from them a wider picture of his mathematical and 
philosophical environment. We only receive glimpses of those mathe-
matical and logical trends which influenced Frege or to which he was 
opposed. In particular, almost nothing is said about the foundationalist 
movement in nineteenth-century mathematics or the opposition between 
the Weierstrassian and the Riemannian approaches, although they are es-
sential to provide the context for Frege’s early work in geometry and his 
logicist project.2 Moreover, only those philosophers that play a signifi-
cant role in the analytic tradition are covered at length in Jacquette’s dis-
cussion. Mathematicians and logicians with whom Frege engaged in 
debates concerning topics that were not directly connected with the logi-
cist project are consistently poorly represented, if considered at all. They 
are never substantially covered on account of the value of their work or 
in virtue of their historical importance, but only mentioned insofar as 
Frege had something logicism-related to say about them. One significant 
example is Hilbert, whose view on the foundations of geometry is ren-
dered according to a popular understanding of formalism that does not 
justice to the complexity of his thought [pp. 287–288]. Schröder, one of 
the main proponents of the algebra of logic tradition – with whom Frege 
had a significant debate in response to the former’s review of Begriffsschrift 
– and Peano, who held an extensive correspondence with Frege and also 
wrote a review of Grundgesetze, are barely mentioned.  
Most of the biographical details in Jacquette’s book are extracted 
from Kreiser’s monograph, which Jacquette duly acknowledges. The bio-
graphical chapters often consist of verbose speculations upon Frege’s feel-
ings. Instead of limiting himself to the proven facts, Jacquette spends 
several passages discussing how Frege could have reacted to certain events. 
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While he is considering Frege’s wife death in 1904, Jacquette states that 
“[h]er parting may have been interpreted by Frege in moments of ill hu-
mor as yet another savage contradiction in what should have been a logi-
cally well-ordered universe” [p. 503]. Another significant example is the 
four-page Prelude, which dramatizes Frege’s reception of Russell’s letter 
dated June 16th 1902, in which Russell warns Frege of the discovery of 
what became known as Russell’s paradox. It is also worth noting that 
Jacquette seemed to have a specific interest in the psychological analyses 
of photographs, and devotes several pages to speculation upon Frege’s 
appearance in some of the pictures that have been preserved (which, 
surprisingly, this book does not include). Reflecting on a picture showing 
Frege’s family around 1860, Jacquette states that “it is tempting to imag-
ine dour nights of dutiful romance between Auguste and Karl Alexander 
[Frege’s parents] in heavy linen night garments” [p. 11]. All in all, the bi-
ographical fragments of this book are too long, do not add anything sub-
stantially new that could not be found in Kreiser (2001) and a significant 
proportion of them is uninteresting if not inadequate. 
The chapters that deal with the content of Frege’s works are almost 
exclusively reduced to the development of the logicist thesis. One cannot 
deny that logicism played a prominent role in Frege’s work but it would 
be too simplistic to limit his thought to the attempt to reduce arithmetic 
to logic. Even in the context of the analysis of Frege’s logicism, 
Jacquette’s account might be too restricted. He claims that “Frege can be 
known only through his work in symbolic logic” [p. 9] and insists that 
the construction of a logical calculus was instrumental to a rigorous 
proof that all arithmetical laws are logical. However, he spends little time 
describing – as I shall defend below – the nature and particularities of 
the two versions of the calculus Frege developed during his lifetime. 
More importantly, the content of Frege’s Nachlaß – Frege’s unpublished 
writings – is not systematically considered on the basis that these writ-
ings “are a world unto themselves” and “for the most part [...] do noth-
ing to advance Frege’s logicism’’ [p. 602]. Frege’s work on mathematics, 
and specifically on geometry, is poorly covered. Jacquette’s remarks 
about Frege’s dissertation (1873) and Habilitationsschrift (1874) are aimed 
at presenting these works as antecedents to the logicist project; their ac-
tual content and relevance as mathematical works are not assessed. In 
fact, even though Jacquette devotes a chapter to the years Frege spent 
working on his Habilitationsscrhift, he does not provide a single textual 
reference to this work; nothing of what Jacquette claims about [Frege 
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(1874)] is supported with textual evidence. Besides, the content of Frege’s 
courses at the University of Jena is not properly considered. Likewise, 
Frege’s polemic with Hilbert, which has been the object of a multitude 
of historical studies, is barely touched upon [pp. 442-447] and, moreover, 
there is no connection in Jacquette’s account of this polemic with essen-
tial notions such as the completeness of a mathematical theory or its 
consistency. 
Jacquette avoids scholarly debate in general and typically refers to 
the secondary literature in his footnotes (which are sometimes somewhat 
disconnected from the main narrative). Nevertheless, the author does 
not refrain from explaining his own interpretation of several aspects of 
Frege’s thought. Some of these expository passages are based on previ-
ous publications and always argue for heterodox theses. In this context, 
the lack of relevant and substantial references to alternative reconstruc-
tions of those elements of Frege’s work that Jacquette covers in detail 
appears a troublesome choice, especially since, as we shall see below, 
Jacquette’s analyses are often based on misconceptions and problematic 
readings of the sources. 
I shall focus the following discussion on Jacquette’s account of 
Frege’s three major works, Begriffsschrift, Grundlagen and Grundgesetze, as 
well as his interpretation of the nature of Russell’s paradox. 
The chapter devoted to Begriffsschrift is characterised by two main 
aspects: a lengthy explanation of how the logical system developed by 
Frege in 1879, the concept-script, could render categorical judgements; 
and a discussion on the similarities between the language of the concept-
script and that of arithmetic. The key question in Jacquette’s account of 
Begriffsschrift is the fact that its language is, as stated by Frege in the very 
title of this book, “modelled upon that of arithmetic”.  
This perspective fails to consider some of the most important aspects 
of Frege’s 1879 work. Considering Begriffsschrift’s reception, Jacquette af-
firmed that “[t]he trouble was that Frege had not sufficiently explained the 
logic’s intended purpose” [p. 164]. This is an interesting historical ques-
tion, since it is quite clear from the reviews of Begriffsschrift that Frege’s 
goals in this work were not properly understood. That said, Frege explic-
itly stated in the Preface that the construction of the concept-script had 
two different goals. First, by means of this logical system, Frege attempt-
ed to establish rigorous foundations for some propositions which are 
relevant in arithmetic and justify the case that intuition does not play any 
role in their proofs [(1879), p. x]. Second, Frege aimed at using the con-
cept-script as a tool for scientific languages, in such a way that it provid-
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ed a formal apparatus adequate for the rigorization of their proofs as well 
as their processes of concept formation [(1879), p. xii]. Frege devoted two 
papers to exemplify this second goal [(1879b,1880-1881)]. In (1880-1881), 
pp. 23-29, Frege showed that the logical symbols of the concept-script 
could be combined with the primitive symbols of mathematics for the 
rigorous definition of complex mathematical notions, such as the notion 
of the continuity of a function.  
Leaving aside the genesis and motivations of Begriffsschrift, Jacquette’s 
account of the 1879 concept-script presents significant shortcomings. One 
of the most important components of this logical system is the notion of 
function. How to understand a Begriffsschrift function is relevant for the 
development of this concept, particularly bearing in mind the later no-
tion which Frege adopted from 1891 onwards. In Begriffsschrift, Frege pre-
sented a function as that part of an expression that, unlike the argument 
– which can be replaced – remains fixed [(1879), §9]. Frege first referred 
to second-order concepts in 1884 but it took him seven years to be able 
to define a concept as a specific kind of a function — which no longer 
was defined as the component of an expression. The attribution of un-
saturation to the notion of function, the introduction of truth-values as 
possible values of a function and the separation between functional lev-
els were essential elements in Frege’s late conception of a function, and 
none of them were present in Begriffsschrift. However, Jacquette states that 
Begriffsschrift’s concept-script “was a logic of concept-functions, existent 
objects, and second-level concept-functions of first-level concept-
functions” [p. 132]. This kind of historical inaccuracy can also be seen 
concerning Begriffsschrift’s notion of generality. According to Jacquette, 
“[t]he quantifier logic of the Begriffsschrift was embryonic in his Habilita-
tionsschrift of 1874” [p. 110]. This claim is repeated several times, but 
Jacquette offers no evidence in support of it. The genesis and sources of 
influence of Frege’s first masterwork, Begriffsschrift, are a complex historical 
problem and bold and unsupported claims such as Jacquette’s make no 
contribution.  
Jacquette insists that Frege’s introduction of negation was instru-
mental in representing indirect arguments in the concept-script [p. 124], 
something that set this logical system apart from Boolean logic. One el-
ement of Frege’s criticism of Boolean logic in the papers he wrote after 
the publication of Begriffsschrift was indeed the inadequacy of Boolean log-
ic for the representation of all the formal steps that constitute a proof 
[see Frege (1880–1881), pp. 43-44]. However, in this context Frege did 
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not mention indirect proofs. In fact, none of the proofs included in Be-
griffsschrift are indirect: there are no derivations with premises in this work 
and no reasoning by reductio. Even more startling is Jacquette’s remark 
that the propositional negation introduced in Begriffsschrift “released into 
his system the viper that would make it vulnerable to the kind of formal 
logical paradox that Russell eventually discovered” [p. 124]. This claim, 
which is hard to understand by itself, is repeated several times throughout 
Jacquette’s book; he neither explains it nor offers any justification. In fact, 
in Chapter 11, when he considers the nature of Russell’s paradox, the pur-
ported problematic character of negation is not further developed. 
As a means to presenting the axiomatic system of Begriffsschrift, 
Jacquette provides a list of the logical laws of the concept-script and 
translates them into a first-order language. No predicate variable occurs 
in these translations; after the author’s insistence that the concept-script 
is a higher-order formal system, one wonders what principles determine 
the use of second-order quantification. Jacquette offers none. In fact, we 
are only given a passing remark about the inference rules of the concept 
script [p. 144], but no list or enumeration is given. This is particularly un-
fortunate since there has been a scholarly debate concerning the pres-
ence of a substitution rule in Begriffsschrift.  
In the second place, I turn to Jacquette’s account of Grundlagen. In 
the analytic tradition, this book stands out as one of Frege’s most studied 
works. Jacquette offers a lengthy commentary of Grundlagen and puts the 
focus on Frege’s informal definition of the concept of Anzahl.3 He insists 
that Frege’s definition of this concept is at risk of circularity [p. 251]. His 
main argument seems to be that this definition relies on the notion of 
equinumerosity, the definition of which in turn presupposes the notion 
of one (since two concepts are equinumerous if a one-one correlation can 
be established between the objects which fall under them). Jacquette 
acknowledges that the phrase ‘one-one correlation’ comes from Austin’s 
translation of Grundlagen, while the original German is ‘beiderseits eindeutige 
Zuordnung’. Hence, the question is whether the notion of equinumerosity 
presupposes the concept of the number one. As Kremer (2008) and Schirn 
(2010), p. 58, state, Frege resolved this kind of objection in Grundlagen 
(1884), §68. Moreover, Frege’s informal definition of equinumerosity 
[(1884), §§71-72] shows that the concept of the number one is not re-
quired at all; the formal expression of this definition makes this blatant. 
To complicate things, Jacquette’s discussion is clouded by his erratic ref-
erence to concepts and his confusion between the notions of equality 
and equinumerosity. He states that “[n]umber in expressions concerning 
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the number of Fs is simply the extension of the concept “=F,” or “equal 
or identical to the concept F’” [p. 244]. This is difficult to understand: 
the number that belongs to the concept F is the extension of the concept 
“equinumerous with F”, while the expression ‘=F’ is not acceptable for 
Frege since a concept is an unsaturated entity that cannot be the argu-
ment of an equality (i.e., a relation that holds between objects). 
Jacquette’s convoluted writing style pushes this confusion even further 
with phrases such as “[a]n identity or numerical equation such as F=G 
(for numerical concepts F and G)” [p. 242]. Leaving aside the enigmatic 
notion of numerical concepts, it must be remarked that an equation ex-
presses the equality between numbers, not concepts. It can be said, of 
course, that two concepts are equinumerous, or that a concept falls un-
der the concept “equinumerous to the concept F”, yet it should be clear 
that equality and equinumerosity are different relations that hold be-
tween different kinds of entities.  
In the third place, Jacquette’s commentary to Grundgesetze is gravely 
unbalanced: in a forty-two-page chapter, Jacquette devotes twenty-eight 
pages to an almost sensationalist review of some parts of the Foreword, 
where Frege explained the reasons for the late publication of the book 
and addressed criticism to Erdmann’s Logic; eight pages to the reception 
of Grundgesetze; six pages to the actual concept-script presented in vol-
ume I; and, finally, one page and a paragraph to volume II.4 
Jacquette’s account of the concept-script presented in Grundgesetze is 
brief and superficial. Perhaps assuming that this topic is already covered in 
the chapter devoted to Begriffsschrift, the language of the 1893 concept-script 
is not even mentioned, save for some remarks about negation — which 
again push its role in the inconsistency of the system. One of the results 
of the intense philosophical work shown in the 1891-1892 papers is a 
semantical apparatus that shapes the syntax of the Grundgesetze concept-
script. For instance, the characterisation of the notion of function allowed 
Frege to introduce the logical symbols of the concept-script as function 
names. This theoretical apparatus was absent in Begriffsschrift, and the na-
ture of the language presented there reflects a substantive difference 
which passes unnoticed by Jacquette. 
The presentation of the axiomatic system of Grundgesetze is no bet-
ter. As a means to introduce the inference rules of this late concept-
script, a quotation from the summary of inference rules offered by Frege 
in Grundgesetze (1893), §48, is given without any comment [p. 403]. 
Jacquette fails to mention that Frege’s list of inference rules contains 
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twelve items, while the quotation is partial and only contains the first 
four. A similar lack of care is shown in Jacquette’s account of a concept-
script proof. As an example of a derivation, Jacquette again provides a 
quotation without any comment [p. 404]. However, the quotation only 
contains an informal explanation Frege offered before the actual proof 
of a theorem [(1893), §54] from which the proposition indicated in the 
quotation would be proved. The quotation contains no proof: it does not 
include any explicit application of an inference rule and no exhaustive list 
of the logical principles used is given.  
As an excuse for his brief treatment of the concept-script, Jacquette 
argues that “[f]ine technicalities of Frege’s proof in Grundgesetze are beyond 
the scope of biography” [p. 402]. This is a fair point, but it has to be re-
membered that he enters into lengthy analyses of specific aspects of Fre-
ge’s works such as the vulnerability of the concept-script to the paradox 
and the nature of the notions of Sinn and Bedeutung. He devoted whole 
chapters to each of these topics. All in all, it is difficult to see how a reader 
can get a proper grasp of Frege’s symbolic logic – which was assumed by 
Jacquette to be an essential prerequisite for one to know Frege [p. 9] – if it 
is only exemplified by means of partial and equivocal quotations. 
As a result, the reader cannot but conclude that not much about 
Grundgesetze can be learned from Jacquette’s account. His chapter on 
Grundgesetze is one of the best examples of the disregard for Frege’s logic 
that can be found in Frege: A Philosophical Biography.  
After describing in detail the contents of Russell’s letter to Frege of 
June 16th 1902 and analysing the nature of the class suggested by Russell 
from which the paradox could be generated, Jacquette argues for the 
suggestive thesis that “Frege’s Begriffsschrift alone or as modified and ap-
plied in Grundgesetze I and II already had all the resources it needed just as 
it stood to defeat Russell’s putative paradox” [p. 497]. In order to better 
understand Jacquette’s position, it is worth quoting his reasoning in full: 
 
What has entered the history of logic’s hall of fame as Russell’s paradox is 
no more a logical antinomy than is the barber “paradox”. If Frege had re-
sponded in this way to Russell’s announcement of a contradiction in his 
letter to Frege of 16 June 1902, Frege would not have needed at least the 
same kind of anxious lament as the 1903 Afterword to Grundgesetze II. 
More importantly, he could have upheld Axiom V without the restrictive 
conditionalization of co-extensionality identity conditions for concept-
functions revised in V’. He could have sustained, at least for a time, all of 
his Grundgesetze arithmetic and the philosophical logicism it was meant to 
substantiate. He could have answered Russell’s paradox instead of letting 
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it freeze him in his tracks […]. The question of continuing critical histori-
cal inquiry is whether there was any sound basis in the first place to sup-
pose that Russell had found anything more than a superficial conundrum 
in Frege’s Grundgesetze, easily dissolved by the Russell paradox meta-
dilemma as of no greater moment for logic than the ontically deprived 
barber [pp. 501–502].  
 
Jacquette’s main argument seems to be that Russell’s paradox is not real-
ly a threat to Grundgesetze’s concept-script and, thus, to Frege’s late logi-
cism, because the class of classes that do not belong to themselves 
(called ‘K’) could contain elements that do not have the property of be-
ing a class that does not belong to itself. In his words, “[i]f Frege’s K be-
longs to itself, it does not follow logically that K does not belong to itself. 
It does not follow that K does not belong to K, unless K is redefined as 
the class not only of all those classes that do not belong to themselves, 
but of all and only those. Compare throughout: It may be true that all 
Greeks are mortal, but it does not follow logically from the fact that only 
Greeks are mortal, contrary to which inference counterexamples are in 
plentiful supply” [p. 476]. It is difficult to make sense of this interpreta-
tion of the class K. After all, what are the elements of the class of Greeks 
and the class of classes whose cardinality is 2 but Greek human beings 
and classes with two elements, respectively?  
Leaving Jacquette’s understanding of the paradox aside, it should 
be noted that Frege proved in the Afterword to the second volume of 
Grundgesetze that (1) the application of the class K to proposition (Vb) – a 
theorem obtained from basic law (V) – leads to an inconsistency [(1903), 
pp. 256-257]; and (2) that it is possible to prove in the calculus of the con-
cept-script the negation of a generalisation of (Vb) [(1903), pp. 257-261]. 
The only possible conclusion, which Frege of course assumed, is that the 
1893 concept-script is inconsistent. Frege attempted to reformulate the 
basic law (V) in order to avoid conclusions (1) and (2), but Jacquette’s 
claim is independent of this. Is the discovery of the inconsistency of the 
formal system that supported the whole logicist project nothing “more 
than a superficial conundrum in Frege’s Grundgesetze”? Jacquette’s failure 
to acknowledge the relevance of Frege’s formal results in the Afterword 
is just another example of his carelessness in appreciating Frege’s work.  
Frege: A Philosophical Biography appears to have been neither fully ed-
ited nor proof-read. Several typos and errors can be found, particularly in 
quotations from Grundgesetze in Chapter 9.5 The logical symbols of the 
concept-script are, in general, poorly rendered and without consistency. 
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Biographical chapters seem to have received less editing: one frequently 
finds repetitions and a lack of thematic order. Chapter 5, devoted to the 
transition from Begriffsschrift to Grundlagen, is the best example of this. On 
pp. 190-193, Jacquette starts a section by mentioning Frege’s membership 
of Jena’s Literary Museum; immediately after, without further comment, 
he deals with the reception of Begriffsschrift and, specifically, Schröder’s 
criticism of this work; and, finally, again without transition, he concludes 
the section by reviewing Frege’s programmatic goals.  
By reading Frege: A Philosophical Biography, a reader unfamiliar with 
the secondary literature on Frege might learn the basic elements of Fre-
ge’s life. There is a good deal of information contained in these pages, 
and it may be surprising to discover the lack of academic recognition 
that Frege suffered and the hardships of his life, especially during his last 
years. However, Jacquette’s account of Frege’s philosophical work is so 
unbalanced that it will hardly help the reader to understand the value and 
scope of Frege’s achievements in the foundations of mathematics, logic 
and philosophy. In sum, readers still lack a reliable and informative biog-
raphy of Frege written in English. 
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NOTES 
 
1 See, for instance, Bynum (1972) or Beaney (1997). 
2 Jacquette could at least have referred to the relevant literature on the top-
ic. See, for instance, Wilson (1992), Tappenden (2006). 
3 Jacquette’s account of Grundlagen seems to be based on the introduction 
to his translation [Frege (2007)]. This translation, and in particular its introduc-
tion, has been critically reviewed by Kremer (2008) and Schrin (2010). Jacquette 
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neither mentioned nor modified his analysis according to Kremer’s and Schirn’s 
meticulous criticisms.  
4 Jacquette’s book, however, contains a lengthy treatment of the After-
word to the second volume of Grundgesetze. It can be found in Chapter 11: The 
Crucible of Logicism and the Crisis of Russell’s Paradox (1902–1904). 
5 See, for example, the quotation included on pp. 399-400. No ellipsis in-
dicators inform that there is a missing passage in the third line. The quotation 
contains several occurrences of exponentiations such as ‘23’; in the quote, they 
are rendered as ‘23’, as ‘2’ or even as ‘2w’. One occurrence in the fifth line was 
corrected, but not according to the source, because it is rendered ‘2[x]2’ instead 
of ‘22’. 
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RESUMEN 
Analizo críticamente Frege: A Philosophical Biography de Dale Jacquette. En primer lu-
gar, ofrezco una breve panorámica del libro de Jacquette. En segundo lugar, evalúo la inter-
pretación de Jacquette de las tres grandes obras de Frege, Begriffsschrift, Grundlagen der 
Arithmetik y Grundgesetze der Arithmetik; y concluyo que el autor no representa fielmente su 
contenido. Por último, proporciono comentarios generales y de tipo técnico. 
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ABSTRACT 
I critically discuss Dale Jacquette’s Frege: A Philosophical Biography. First, I provide a 
short overview of Jacquette’s book. Second, I evaluate Jacquette’s interpretation of Frege’s 
three major works, Begriffsschrift, Grundlagen der Arithmetik and Grundgesetze der Arithmetik; and 
conclude that the author does not faithfully represent their content. Finally, I offer some 
technical and general remarks.  
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